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Suspects, especially innocent ones, are highly susceptible to waiving their interrogation
rights. This research tested the ability of two strategies to overcome innocent suspects’
willingness to waive their rights. One strategy was based on the social influence of
scarcity (i.e., not constraining the pre-interrogation time limit). The other strategy
focused on disrupting individuals’ cognitive fluency during the decision-making
process (i.e., violating their induced expectation of offering a waiver). Disrupting
innocent individuals’ cognitive fluency increased their willingness to invoke their rights
and, notably, was not qualified by interactions with any other factors. However,
scarcity did not influence individuals’ pre-interrogation decision-making. Results also
further established the association between innocent individuals’ naïve mindset and
their willingness to waive their rights – specifically, innocents’willingness to waive their
rights increased with the strength of their just world beliefs. The theoretical and applied
implications of these findings are discussed. The importance and benefit of reforming
pre-interrogation protocols using fair and feasible strategies that would disrupt
suspects’ cognitive fluency are emphasized. Copyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Interrogation rights are intended to ensure that suspects are advised of their rights to avoid
offering self-incriminating statements and to have legal counsel during any potential sub-
sequent custodial interview (e.g., police cautions inCanada, England, andWales;Miranda
rights in theUnited States). Yetmost suspects waive their interrogation rights (Leo, 1996a;
Schulhofer, 1996). Laboratory and field research have impressively identified various fac-
tors that are associated with high waiver rates (e.g., Feld, 2013; Owen-Kostelnik,
Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006; Scherr & Madon, 2013; for a review, see Kassin et al., 2010).
However, very little research has focused on identifying factors that can overcome sus-
pects’ tendencies to waive their rights (for examples of exceptions, see Eastwood & Snook,
2012; Rogers, Fiduccia, Robinson, Steadham, & Drogin, 2013; Snook et al., 2014).
Findings from the basic and applied psychological literatures offer several ways to further
the original intent of the procedural safeguards offered via suspects’ interrogation rights.
For example, police may frame suspects’ opportunity to talk and convince interrogators
of their innocence as scarce and limited (e.g., Feld, 2006; Leo, 1996a). Providing suspects
with sufficient time to make their pre-interrogation decisions should increase suspects’* Correspondence to: Kyle C. Scherr, Department of Psychology, Central Michigan University, Sloan Hall
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Improving pre-interrogation decision-making among innocents 565willingness to invoke their rights. Additionally, interrogators often use strategies that in-
duce suspects with the expectation that they should offer a waiver and this expectation is
then used as a heuristic during the decision-making process (e.g., Domanico, Cicchini,
& White, 2012; Levesque, 2006). Informing suspects of their actual choice between
waiving or invoking their rights should increase suspects’ willingness to invoke their rights
because it will disrupt their heuristic processing. Specifically, providing suspects with
information that is inconsistent with an implied expectation of a waiver should disrupt their
heuristic-driven fluid processing that typically would lead them to offer a waiver. It seems
especially prudent to recognize approaches that benefit the pre-interrogation decision-
making of suspects who are at risk for waiving their interrogation rights, such as innocents
(Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Moore & Gagnier, 2008; Scherr & Franks, 2015). Because
offering a waiver predicts an increased risk of confession (Gillard, Rogers, Kelsey, &
Robinson, 2014), reducing innocents’ tendency to waive their rights has the potential to
minimize the likelihood of wrongful convictions and the substantial subsequent individual
and societal costs (Conroy & Warden, 2011; Garrett, 2011; Kassin, 2012).
Accordingly, this research examined the extent to which reframing the social
influence of scarcity and disrupting individuals’ cognitive fluency could overcome the
power of innocent suspects’ naïve mindset during pre-interrogation decision-making.
We begin by discussing pertinent literatures, both social science and legal, and then
follow with an overview of the present research.PRE-INTERROGATION DECISION-MAKING
Myriad situational and individual difference factors influence suspects’ decision to waive
or invoke their rights. Research examining suspects’ pre-interrogation decision-making
has identified several factors that affect the risk of offering a waiver, such as youth
(Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006), intelligence (Clare & Gudjonsson, 1991; Everington &
Fulero, 1999; Fulero & Everington, 1995; O′Connell, Garmoe, & Goldstein, 2005),
mental health status (Cooper & Zapf, 2008), number of arrests (Leo, 1996a; Softley,
1980), suspects’ guilt or innocence (Kassin & Norwick, 2004), and manipulative police
tactics (Scherr & Franks, 2015; Scherr & Madon, 2013). The latter two risk factors –
suspects’ guilt status and police tactics – are specifically germane to the current study.
Perhaps one of the most surprising risk factors associated with offering a waiver of
interrogation rights is suspects’ innocence (Kassin, 2005, Leo, 1996a; Moore &
Gagnier, 2008). Laboratory experiments have demonstrated the power of innocence
and found that innocent individuals are more willing than guilty ones to waive their
rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Scherr & Franks, 2015). This idea is also supported
by naturalistic observation of police interrogations (Leo, 1996a) and personal anec-
dotes of the wrongfully convicted (e.g., Connery, 1996). Although multiple aspects
are thought to motivate innocent suspects’ willingness to waive their rights, one facet
of the phenomenology of innocence, just world beliefs, has been empirically examined
(Scherr & Franks, 2015). Individuals who more strongly endorse just world beliefs
suppose that people’s actions predictably result in fair and appropriate outcomes
(e.g., good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people; Lerner,
1980). Because these beliefs reliably affect behaviors (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005 for a
review), innocent individuals who strongly endorse these beliefs should be guided by
the spurious idea that their innocence will protect them in a fair and just world.Copyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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Examining this idea, research has demonstrated that innocent individuals who strongly
endorse just world beliefs are less influenced by police tactics when making their pre-
interrogation decisions than are innocent individuals who weakly endorse these beliefs.
Innocent individuals who strongly endorse just world ideologies presumably rely more
on their naïve beliefs than on social influences (Scherr & Franks, 2015). Therefore, any
approach aimed at decreasing innocent suspects’ waiver rates should ideally be able to
overcome the influence of some innocent suspects’ specious notion that the world is a
fair and just place.
Reframing Pre-interrogation Scarcity Ploys
The second relevant factor associated with suspects’ propensity to waive their
interrogation rights is the range of strategies employed by law enforcement. Although
the precise frequency with which police tactics are used is unknown, the use of
manipulative tactics to obtain waivers is one of the most robust findings in the literature
(for a review, see Kassin et al., 2010). These techniques include offering small luxuries
(Simon, 1991), treating the pre-interrogation process as a formality (Feld, 2013a, b;
Scherr & Madon, 2013), and approaching the situation as a confidence game, much
like a con artist (Leo, 1996a).
Another way in which law enforcement officers obtain a waiver, especially among
suspects claiming innocence, is by treating the opportunity to talk as a scarce resource
(e.g., Leo, 1996a). This strategy, referred to as “scarcity ploys” in the psychological
literature, causes people to put a high value on the ostensibly fleeting opportunity
(Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010). The effects of scarcity have been reliably demonstrated
across contexts: consumers in Miami placed more value on certain laundry detergents
after they were banned (Mazis, 1975), potential mates become more attractive to
unattached bar patrons as closing time approaches (Madey et al., 2010), and supermar-
kets purchase more import foods when they perceive (or are even led to believe) that
there will be a shortage of the import foods (Knishinsky, 1982).
Naturalistic observations have also found that scarcity tactics are used during actual
pre-interrogations, especially when suspects claim innocence. Indeed, one researcher
observed a pre-interrogation in which “…the suspect immediately denied any wrong-
doing… The detective emphasized that it would be important for the suspect to tell
the truth, so that he could clear himself if he was not guilty. This would be his only
opportunity to tell his side of the story” (Leo, 1996a, p. 272). Based on the basic social
science literature and pre-interrogation observations, it seems that changing the
framing of the decision-making process from an immediate decision to one without
strict time constraints should increase innocent individuals’ willingness to invoke their
interrogation rights.
Disrupting Pre-interrogation Cognitive Fluency
The social influence strategies used by some interrogators can also undermine suspects’
decision-making by affecting their cognitive fluency. Cognitive fluency is the ease with
which one’s mental processes operate without disruption or interference (Unkelbach,
2006). To the extent that their processing is not interrupted, people will engage in
low-effort, fluid processing (e.g., heuristics and intuitions) to form impressions, makeCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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events are thought to be more common when individuals can more easily recall exam-
ples (Tversky &Kahneman, 1973), consumers make decisions based on heuristics when
their processing remains fluid (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007), among
others. However, when people’s cognitive fluency is disrupted, people tend to engage
in deeper, more critical processing. Such cognitive disfluency tends to act as an indica-
tor that individuals should figuratively step back and reassess the situation.
One social influence strategy that affects suspects’ cognitive fluency is when interro-
gators induce an expectation that a waiver will be offered (Domanico et al., 2012;
Levesque, 2006). For instance, naturalistic research has found that some interrogators
trivialize and downplay the purpose of interrogation rights (e.g., Feld, 2013a,b; Leo,
1996a), communicate anticipations that suspects’ will waive their rights (e.g., Feld,
2013a,b), and implicitly suggest that offering a waiver is typical (e.g., Domanico
et al., 2012; Levesque, 2006). Critically, experimental research has demonstrated that
these techniques cause individuals to waive their rights (e.g., Scherr & Franks, 2015;
Scherr &Madon, 2013). Such social influence strategies imply that waiving one’s rights
is normative and, consequently, become a heuristic that suspects use when making
their pre-interrogation decision. As such, when suspects are induced with these
expectations they rely on this heuristic to make their pre-interrogation decision and
behave accordingly – that is, they tend to offer a waiver.
On the other hand, if suspects’ heuristic processing during pre-interrogation
decision-making is disrupted, it should decrease their inclination to waive their interro-
gation rights. For example, people engage in the confirmation bias less when they
experience disfluency (Hernandez & Preston, 2013), high-school students perform bet-
ter on exams (Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2011), and consumers
make more informed decisions when their cognitive fluency is disrupted (e.g., Alter
et al., 2007). Based on these literatures, then, suspects should be more likely to waive
their rights when their cognitive fluency associated with the induced expectation is
not disrupted. However, suspects should be more likely to invoke their rights when their
cognitive fluency associated with the induced expectation is disrupted.
Research Overview
The present research examined the potential of two factors – reframing the pre-interrogation
decision time frame as unlimited instead of immediate and disrupting individuals’
cognitive fluency during the decision-making process – to reduce suspects’ willingness
to waive their rights. Because the aim of this project was to identify ways to improve
pre-interrogation decision-making among high-risk individuals, we focused solely on
innocents. Exclusively examining guilty or innocent individuals during interrogation
research is a frequently employed approach (e.g., Gillard et al., 2014; Perillo & Kassin,
2011; Pimental, Arndorfer, & Malloy, 2015; Scherr & Madon, 2012, 2013; Wright,
Wade, & Watson, 2013).
Adapting procedures from Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and Kassin (2005), all par-
ticipants were wrongfully accused (i.e., all were innocent) of having inappropriately
shared answers to a logic problem with a confederate partner. Participants were led
to believe that they would have to discuss the incident with the professor in charge of
the experiment and were asked to sign a waiver foregoing their right to have a student
advocate present during the meeting. To manipulate the scarcity of the time frameCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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decision immediately or that they should take as much time as they needed to make
their decision. To manipulate cognitive fluency, all participants were first induced
with the expectancy that they would simply sign the waiver. Some participants were
then given information consistent with the expectancy, while others were given
inconsistent information in order to disrupt their cognitive fluency. Participants’
decision to sign (i.e., waive) or not sign (i.e., invoke) a rights document was the out-
come measure.METHOD
Participants
Undergraduates (N = 290) from a large US university participated for partial course
credit. All participants were native English speakers and at least 18 years of age
(M = 19.72, SD = 2.27). The sample included 100 males and 189 females (one partic-
ipant did not disclose sex). The majority of the sample was White (n = 233; 80%), with
much less of the sample identifying as African-American (n = 30; 10%), and other
racial minorities (n = 27; 10%). Out of the entire sample, two participants inappropri-
ately shared answers (i.e., their behaviors made them guilty and not innocent) and were
removed from sample.
Experimental Design
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (scarcity: immediate vs. unlimited) × 2
(cognitive fluency: uninterrupted vs. disrupted) between-subjects experimental de-
sign. All participants were falsely accused of sharing answers to a logic problem and
told that they would need to meet with the professor conducting the experiment to
discuss the consequences of their misconduct. Participants were then presented with
a waiver document giving them the option to waive their right to have a student
advocate present during the meeting with the professor. Scarcity was manipulated
by emphasizing either that a decision needed to be made immediately (immediate
conditions) or that participants could take as much time as they needed to make their
decision (unlimited conditions). Cognitive fluency was manipulated by giving partic-
ipants consistent information with the original expectation that they should sign and
complete the document (uninterrupted conditions) or by clarifying to participants




Prior experience with the criminal justice system can influence suspects’ willingness to
waive their rights (e.g., Leo, 1996a; Softley, 1980). To account for any potential effects
these experiences may have had on participants’ outcomes, we asked participants to
report the number of times they had been arrested. A frequency analysis indicated thatCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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(~2.5%) reported having been arrested once, and two participants reported having been
arrested twice (~1%). One participant did not disclose number of arrests.
Just World Beliefs
The Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) was administered to assess participants’
belief that the world is a fair and predictable place. The scale consists of 20 items with
response options ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items were
reverse-scored, as appropriate, and then each participant’s responses were averaged
to come up with a composite just world belief score. Higher scores indicate a higher
degree of just world belief endorsement.
Waiver Form
A single-spaced document, approximately half a page long, informed participants of
their rights (referred to as a misconduct policy). Participants were also given a separate
form, which was the document participants could sign to waive their rights. This waiver
form consisted of a signature line and a one-sentence statement clearly indicating to
participants that by signing the form they were waiving their right to have a student
advocate as a representative during the meeting with the professor. To bolster the
authenticity of both documents, they were printed on résumé paper (i.e., paper woven
with a small mixture of cotton). Of the 288 participants, 184 (~64%) waived their right
to a student advocate.
Manipulation Check
To verify that participants remembered what they were told about the time frame of
their decision, participants responded by indicating one of the following: (a) nothing;
(b) that I could take as long as I needed; or (c) that I had to make my decision now.
Suspicion Check
At the end of the experiment, participants responded to open-ended questions asking
them what they believed to be under investigation in the experiment. Participants
were identified as suspicious if they indicated that the accusation was not believable,
if they were suspicious of the confederate, or if they identified the main purpose of the
experiment. Participants were also asked to give a confidence rating from 1 (not at all
certain – It’s a total guess) to 5 (100% certain) for each open-ended question to
which they responded. Participants were labeled as suspicious and removed from
main analyses if they indicated an accurate suspicion about the accusation, confeder-
ate, or purpose of the experiment and also marked 100% certain as their confidence
rating.
Procedure
Upon arrival to the experimental session, each participant was introduced to a confed-
erate who acted as a partner for the session. Both the participant and the confederateCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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examine how cognitive processes influence people’s abilities to make decisions individ-
ually versus as a team. The participant and confederate then individually completed
surveys assessing demographic information and their just world beliefs. Following the
completion of these assessments, the pair was left alone for a few minutes to become
acquainted before receiving some individual and team logic packets. The experimenter
emphasized that the pair should work together to solve the team problems, but that they
needed to work independently to solve the individual problems. After the pair finished
the logic problems, they completed a filler survey while the experimenter left to osten-
sibly grade the logic packets. The experimenter returned to the room 3 minutes later,
visibly annoyed, and indicated that there was a problem with their answers to one
of the individual logic problems. The experimenter explained that the confederate
and the participant would be spoken to separately and escorted the confederate out
of the room. After 5 minutes, the experimenter returned to the original room and
conveyed suspicion to the participant that both members of the pair had the same
wrong answer to one of the individual logic problems. The experimenter went on
to suggest that the pair had cheated on this individual problem that they were explic-
itly told not to work on together. Participants were informed that the professor in
charge of the study had been notified and that he seemed upset and might consider
this a case of cheating. The experimenter further explained that departmental policy
required a third party to handle the situation and this person would be arriving
shortly.
After the first experimenter left the room, a second experimenter entered and
explained that the participant would be given a departmental form to read and then
another form to sign and complete. This point was emphasized because it served to
induce the expectation that a waiver would be offered. The second experimenter then
read the misconduct policy outlining the procedure to be followed in cases of academic
dishonesty to the participant, including the meeting with the professor. The participant
was also handed the misconduct policy form to read. Once the participant was finished
reading the form, the second experimenter presented the participant with the waiver
form. At this time, both of the experimental manipulations occurred. In the immedi-
ate conditions, participants were told they had to make their decision immediately so
that the form could be returned to the department. In the unlimited conditions,
participants were told they could take as long as they needed. In the uninterrupted
conditions, participants were simply told to complete the form, which is a message
that was consistent with the original expectation. In the disrupted conditions, partici-
pants were explicitly informed that they had a choice of whether or not to sign the
form, which is a message that was inconsistent with the original expectation. After
participants made their decisions to waive their rights (by signing the form) or to
invoke their rights (by not signing the form), the second experimenter left the room
with the waiver form.
The first experimenter then returned to the room and asked the participant to finish
the experiment while waiting for the professor to arrive. The participant was given a
packet to complete privately, which included both the manipulation check and the
suspicion check items. After completing these assessments, participants were fully
debriefed and given a full explanation of the true purpose of the study and the experi-
mental manipulations. Furthermore, the experimenter emphasized that no professor
was upset or angry about what had happened. Lastly, experimenters made sure thatCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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and answered any remaining questions.RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Suspicion Check
A total of 10 participants provided an accurate suspicion on the open-ended question and
also indicated that they were 100% certain. Although the removal of these participants did
not change the trends and significant effects observed in the main analysis, we opted to
remove these individuals to ensure the integrity of the samples’ responses. As a result,
all subsequent findings are based on a sample of 278 participants.Background Factors
A series of preliminary analyses examined the relationship between pre-interrogation
waiver decisions and several background predictors. Because none of the background
factors were significantly associated with waiver decisions (race, p = 0.56; number of
arrests, p = 0.71; age, p = 0.33; or sex, p = 0.80), these factors were not included in
the main analyses.Just World Beliefs
Because just world beliefs were measured and not manipulated, we conducted an anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) to demonstrate that participants had similar levels of just
world beliefs across conditions. Indeed, no significant differences emerged between
the levels of the scarcity manipulation (p = 0.70), the cognitive fluency manipulation
(p = 0.42), or the interaction term between the scarcity and cognitive fluency manipu-
lations (p = 0.83). These results eliminate the concern that just world beliefs and the
manipulated factors were confounded. The level of just world belief endorsement for
the entire sample indicated that, overall, the sample had a very slight tendency to
endorse just world beliefs (M = 3.54, SD = 0.40).Manipulation Check
Results of the manipulation check identified 79 participants who incorrectly stated
what they were told during the scarcity manipulation. The results of all of the main
analyses in terms of trends and significance did not change whether these participants
were included or excluded; in fact, the significant observed effects become stronger.
As such, the subsequent main analysis was conducted including the sample of 278
participants.Copyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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The relationships among waiver decisions and scarcity, cognitive fluency, and just
world beliefs were examined using a logistic regression. This analysis estimated coeffi-
cient values by using maximum likelihood logistic regressions. Participants’ decisions
(waive or invoke) were regressed on scarcity (immediate vs. unlimited), cognitive
fluency (uninterrupted vs. disrupted), just world belief endorsements (step 1), and all
two- (step 2), and three-way interactions (step 3). Results related to just world beliefs
are discussed in terms of being strong or weak for ease of interpretation; however, as
recommended, the factor was analyzed as a continuous variable (MacCallum, Zhang,
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented
in Table 1.
The results indicated a main effect of just world beliefs [β = 0.69, SE = 0.34,
p = 0.04, exp.(β) = 1.99 (95% confidence interval, CI: 1.02–3.85)]. Corroborating
initial evidence between suspects’ mindset and their pre-interrogation decision-
making (Scherr & Franks, 2015), this finding further establishes the association
between just world belief endorsements and innocent individuals’ pre-interrogation
decision-making: innocent individuals’ willingness to waive their rights increased with
the strength of their just world beliefs. There was, however, no main effect of scarcity
on participants’ waiver decisions. Although we expected that participants would be
more willing to waive their rights when told to make their decision immediately com-
pared with being allowed to take their time, no significant effects were observed be-
tween these groups [β = 0.10, SE = 0.26, p = 0.69, exp.(β) = 0.90 (95% CI:
0.54–1.50)]. Importantly, though, there was a main effect of cognitive fluency
[β = 0.84, SE = 0.26, p = 0.001, exp.(β) = 0.43 (95% CI: 0.26–0.72)]. Participants
in the disrupted conditions who were given inconsistent and clarifying information
that they had a choice of whether or not to sign were more likely to invoke their rights
compared with participants in the uninterrupted conditions who were given consis-
tent information with the original expectation. There was no evidence of any signifi-
cant two-way (p-values ≥0.09) or three-way (p-values ≥0.42) interactions. Overall,
these results suggest that innocent individuals who strongly endorse just world beliefsTable 1. Main effects and interactions of the logistic regression analysis (N = 278)
Factor β SE Wald p Exp(β) 95% CI
Step 1: Main effects, χ2(3) = 15.43,
p = 0.001
Scarcity 0.10 0.26 0.16 0.69 0.90 0.54–1.50
Cognitive fluency 0.84 0.26 10.30 0.001 0.43 0.26–0.72
Just world beliefs 0.69 0.34 4.13 0.04 1.99 1.02–3.85
Step 2: Two-way interactions,
χ2 (3) = 3.04, p = 0.39
Scarcity × cognitive fluency 0.09 0.53 0.03 0.87 1.09 0.39–3.07
Scarcity × just world beliefs 0.20 0.69 0.09 0.77 0.82 0.21–3.18
Cognitive fluency × just world beliefs 1.20 0.70 2.91 0.09 0.30 0.08–1.20
Step 3: Three-way interaction,
χ2 (1) = 0.67, p = 0.41
Scarcity × cognitive fluency × just
world beliefs
1.16 1.42 0.67 0.42 3.17 0.20–50.89
Note: Scarcity [1 = immediate (n = 139), 2 = infinite (n = 139)]; cognitive fluency [1 = uninterrupted
(n = 140), 2 = disrupted (n = 138)]; outcome variable was probability of waiving (0 = invoked, 1 = waived).
Copyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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perceived expectation to waive one’s rights substantially increases the number of
innocent individuals who invoke their interrogation rights.DISCUSSION
Compared with the majority of interrogation rights research, the current study
examined potential factors that could benefit innocent individuals’ pre-interrogation
decision-making. Although eliminating the scarcity pressure sometimes used during
pre-interrogations did not influence waiver decisions, disrupting cognitive fluency
significantly decreased innocents’ willingness to waive their rights. When individuals
were given information inconsistent with the expectation of a waiver (an expectation
law enforcement often induces in suspects) and were clearly informed that they had a
choice of whether or not to waive their rights, they were less likely to waive their rights
than were those individuals who were given information consistent with the expectation
of offering a waiver. Furthermore, results provided additional support for the notion
that innocence precipitates a naïve mindset that increases a willingness to waive one’s
rights because innocent individuals’ likelihood of waiving their rights increased with
the strength of their just world beliefs.
Using Disfluency to Bring Clarity
A rich body of literature has demonstrated the impact that disrupting people’s cognitive
fluency can have on them. When cognitive fluency is disrupted, the tendency to engage
in the confirmation bias is reduced (Hernandez & Preston, 2013), high-school students
perform better on exams (Diemand-Yauman et al., 2011), individuals are less likely to
be tricked into giving intuitive responses (Alter et al., 2007; Song & Schwarz, 2008),
and consumers make more informed decisions, rather than ones based on heuristics
(Alter et al., 2007). The present study extends this literature by demonstrating the
impact that disrupting people’s cognitive fluency can have during high-stakes, legal
decision-making. During naturalistic pre-interrogations, suspects are frequently in-
duced with an expectation that they should waive their rights, even though such
decisions go against suspects’ best interests (Domanico et al., 2012; Feld, 2013a,b;
Levesque, 2006). Throughout many pre-interrogations, suspects are frequently given
consistent reminders of this expectation. In these environments, their cognitive pro-
cesses remain fluid with the original expectation of offering a waiver. However, if
the expectation is violated in some manner (e.g., they are unequivocally told they have
a choice), their cognitive processes will be disrupted. Such instances that engender
cognitive disfluency are critical because they provide one means of affording suspects
the cognitive wherewithal to step back and reassess the decision-making situation. By
so doing, the potential for suspects to realize and appreciate the magnitude of the deci-
sion increases. Indeed, in the current study, these individuals were significantly less
likely to waive their rights compared with individuals whose cognitive fluency was not
disrupted.
It is also noteworthy to understand the impact that disrupting cognitive fluency has
on innocent individuals’ pre-interrogation decision-making. The lack of any two- or
three-way interactions involving cognitive fluency indicates the impressive influenceCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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constrained by the levels of the other factors (i.e., social influences or just world
beliefs). In this way, disrupting the cognitive fluency often operating during naturalistic
pre-interrogations can have potentially remarkable benefits for innocents’ decision-
making.
Implications
The observed effects have several research and applied implications. This research
further establishes the deleterious association between innocent suspects’ naïve
mindset and their pre-interrogation decision-making. Innocent individuals who more
strongly endorsed beliefs that the world is a fair place and that good things happen to
good people were more likely to waive their rights compared with individuals who en-
dorsed this ideology less strongly. Although this decision-making process makes intui-
tive sense—innocent people feel they have not done anything wrong, that they are good
people and, consequently, nothing bad will happen to them – such decisions can result
in problematic outcomes. In these instances, innocent suspects will be questioned by
interrogators without legal counsel, thereby increasing the likelihood they will offer
false self-incriminating information. As such, demonstrating the association between
such a naïve mindset and the decision to waive one’s rights during pre-interrogation
is an important step in remediating subsequent negative outcomes.
The current research is the first demonstration of the effect that cognitive fluency has
on suspects’ pre-interrogation decision-making. When the expectation of offering a
waiver was violated, innocent individuals were less willing to waive their rights. This
finding provides a strong theoretical explanation for one factor that can benefit the
pre-interrogation decision-making of innocent suspects. Importantly, this finding also
offers a theoretical reason for the impact that making one’s rights explicit has on their
decision-making. In a self-described practical experiment designed to test the assump-
tions underlying two U.S. Supreme Court decisions (i.e., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010;
Florida v. Powell, 2010), individuals who were explicitly informed of their rights were
significantly more likely to invoke their rights compared with those who were not
(Gillard et al., 2014). According to the effects observed in this research, when suspects
are administered their rights in an explicit fashion and their cognitive fluency is
disrupted, they are able to step back and re-evaluate the situation. Hence, one way
interrogators could better inform suspects of their rights is by explicitly advising
suspects that they have a choice of whether to waive or exercise their interrogation
rights. Providing suspects this opportunity reduces the likelihood of waiving their
rights. However, when suspects are not given their rights explicitly, but rather implicitly
(i.e., in a manner upheld by Powell), their cognitive fluency is not disrupted and these
individuals are highly likely to waive their rights.
These findings have meaningful implications for policy reform and the administration
protocols used during pre-interrogations. These findings suggest that strategies can be
adopted to fairly reconcile the differing goals of interrogators and rights advocates. Law
enforcement approach pre-interrogations with a guilt presumptive expectation (Kassin,
Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003) and use a variety of means to obtain a waiver of one’s rights
(e.g., Leo, 1996b). As noted previously, one strategy that researchers and scholars have
observed interrogators using to obtain a waiver is to induce suspects with the expectation
that theywill offer a waiver (Domanico et al., 2012; Feld, 2013a,b; Levesque, 2006). SuchCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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Interrogation rights advocates, however, call for compulsory legal representation for
suspects (e.g., Gudjonsson, 2003; Kassin et al., 2010; Verhoeven & Stevens, 2012). As
demonstrated by the findings of this research and others (e.g., Gillard et al., 2014), an
impartial and feasible approach would be to inform suspects that they have a choice of
whether to waive or invoke their rights, rather than implying that a waiver will be given
or inducing a similar expectation. Taking such an approach is especially important for
innocent suspects who, when subjected to manipulative strategies, may be set up to offer
false self-incriminating evidence during interrogations that may lead to a subsequent
wrongful conviction.
Another way to appreciably advance the realization of suspects’ interrogation rights is to
combine approaches void of manipulative strategies with warnings shown to improve
suspects’ understanding of their rights (e.g., Eastwood & Snook, 2012; Rogers, Rogstad,
Steadham, & Drogin, 2011; Snook et al., 2014). Taking this two-pronged approach
seems particularly valuable because of the robust literatures that have documented indi-
viduals’ poor comprehension across several countries (e.g., Eastwood, Snook, & Luther,
2014; Fenner, Gudjonsson, & Clare, 2002; Rogers et al., 2013; Scherr, Agauas, &
Ashby, 2016) as well as the use of various manipulative tactics during pre-interrogations
(Feld, 2013a,b; Leo, 1996a). Creating these beneficial pre-interrogation environments
would therefore improve both suspects’ ability to understand their rights and pre-
interrogation decision-making abilities.
Future Directions and Limitations
Despite the noteworthy effects observed in this research, there are some limitations that
future research should address. Although it was predicted that giving individuals
sufficient time to make their decision would reduce the rate of waivers, such an effect
was not observed. One reason for this could have been the cognitive fluency manipula-
tion. That is, individuals seem to have been acting correspondingly to the expectation
(i.e., cognitive fluency) or the violation of the expectation (i.e., cognitive disfluency),
regardless of how quickly they were told the decision had to be made. This explanation
offers additional evidence of the power that the expectation and cognitive fluency have
on suspects’ pre-interrogation decision-making. Another possible explanation has to do
with the wording used to vary the immediacy of making the decision. Future research
should examine other ways to reframe instances in which suspects are given sufficient
time to make their decisions. For example, individuals could be informed that they
can have all the time they need to make the decision and also that this decision is not
permanent or binding for the entirety of the ensuing interrogation. In this way, the
decision would appear to be a less scarce opportunity (i.e., it is not an immediate or
one-time resource), thereby potentially helping to ameliorate individuals’ willingness
to waive their rights.
Because of the nature of experimental laboratory research, the employed procedures
reflect an upper-bound approach because participants’ experiences during this study
were not as extreme (e.g., tactics were less coercive) as the experiences of suspects
actually accused of a crime. Indeed, police accusations are highly stressful (e.g., Irving,
1980) and the amount of stress that individuals experience influences their understand-
ing of their rights (e.g., Scherr & Madon, 2012) and their pre-interrogation decision-
making (e.g., Scherr & Franks, 2015). Additionally, instead of having the opportunityCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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student advocate present, thereby potentially reducing their perception of the severity
of the situation.
The background and characteristics of our sample differed in several ways from a
sample of criminal suspects. College students, on average, exhibit a higher level of
intellectual functioning compared with criminal suspects (Ceci & Williams, 1997).
This difference is important to note because research has demonstrated that lower
intellectual ability is a risk factor for offering a waiver of one’s rights (Clare &
Gudjonsson, 1991; Everington & Fulero, 1999; Fulero & Everington, 1995; O’Connell
et al., 2005). College students are also less likely than non-college-educated individuals
to have a history of prior arrests (Brame, Bushway, Paternoster, & Turner, 2014),
which could influence their decision-making, because previous experience with the
legal system increases suspects’ willingness to exercise their rights (Leo, 1996a; Softley,
1980). The sample used in this research is also less likely to be characterized by individ-
ual difference factors (e.g., suggestibility, age, mental health status) that have been
found to influence pre-interrogation outcomes (Cooper & Zapf, 2008; O’Connell
et al., 2005; Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006). Moreover, because participants in the cur-
rent study were all innocent, the results should not necessarily be assumed to typify
guilty suspects. Based on research showing that innocent and guilty suspects differ
across a variety of dimensions (e.g., Guyll et al., 2013; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall,
& Kronkvist, 2006; Kassin, 2005; Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, 2011; Scherr &
Franks, 2015), future research should examine if the observed effects influence guilty
individuals in a similar fashion. In sum, it will be important to examine whether the
effects observed in the present study generalize to a more heterogeneous range of
individuals, suspects who come from vulnerable populations, and guilty suspects.
Nonetheless, any differences that may exist between a college student sample and
suspects in naturalistic pre-interrogations are likely differences of magnitude rather
than effect. Support for this idea comes from both theoretical and empirical research
addressing the power of situational and dispositional influences on pre-interrogation
outcomes (e.g., Kassin et al., 2010; Leo, 1996a; Scherr & Franks, 2015; Scherr &
Madon, 2013). Although our findings are consistent with the extant literature, it is still
likely that they represent conservative estimates compared with those that would occur
in a naturalistic pre-interrogation setting. The idea that the observed effects are conser-
vative estimates strengthens the call for necessary reforms to ensure that the intent of
interrogation rights is realized.CONCLUSION
Suspects are afforded interrogation rights designed to protect them from offering
self-incriminating information and to provide the aid of legal counsel. Most suspects,
especially those who are innocent, do not take advantage of these protections and aids
and, instead, waive their interrogation rights. In addition to further establishing the
relationship between innocent suspects’ naïve mindset and their willingness to waive
their rights, the current research identified an impactful, yet judicious, factor that can
reduce innocent suspects’ willingness to waive their rights. By informing individuals
that they have a choice of whether or not to waive their rights and violating the induced
expectation of offering a waiver, their cognitive processing was disrupted, causing themCopyright # 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 34: 564–579 (2016)
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additional factors that can improve suspects’ pre-interrogation decision-making. In this
way, policy reforms based on empirically supported evidence can be put forward which
have the ability to reduce instances of false confessions and wrongful convictions. The
findings of this research, therefore, have important implications for researchers,
scholars, policymakers, and the legal system and represent a step in the direction of
identifying ways to overcome problematic situational and dispositional factors in
addition to identifying these risks.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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